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COMMENTS 
INTERNATIONAL: LAW-THE UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY 
FORCE-LEGAL STATUS-The United Nations Emergency Force 
(UNEF) was created in November 19561 to facilitate the with-
drawal from Egypt of British, French and Israeli troops.2 By 
February 1957 UNEF had reached a strength of about 6,000 men 
consisting of troop contingents furnished by UN member states 
other than permanent members of the Security Council.3 Its 
headquarters staff is drawn from the United Nations Truce Super-
vision Organization in Palestine,4 and some technical services 
are provided by the Secretariat.5 The troop contingents are sup-
plied from the armed forces of contributing states but carry only 
light arms and are not capable of dealing with anything more 
serious than individual or guerilla type actions. 
The UNEF is the first force of its kind ever used by the United 
Nations. Its objectives, organization and capabilities are alto-
gether different from the UN forces that fought in Korea6 and 
from those provided for in Article 43 of the UN Charter.7 The 
Force is strong enough to carry out its duties of patrolling a mil-
itary truce or cease fire, but cannot and is not intended to resist 
organized military aggression by any state. Secretary General 
Hammarskjold· describes the force as "more than an observer's 
corps, but in no way a military force temporarily controlling the 
territory in which it is stationed .... "8 Its presence and function-
l Res. 1000 (ES-I) and Res. 1001 (ES-I) U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., First Emer-
gency Special Session, Supp. No. 1 {A/3354) (1956). 
2 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[47 (1957). See Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations 
Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 (1957); FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS 
PEACE FORCE (1957); PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 206 
(1957). 
3 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[3 (1957). Units were contributed by Brazil, Canada, Colombia, 
Denmark, Finland, India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia, id., 1[4. Of these 
6,000 only about 3,500 were available for patrol and guard duties, id., 1[6. 
4 Res. 1000 (ES-I) U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., First Emergency Special Session, 
Supp. No. 1 (A/3354) (1956). 
5 U.N. Doc. A/3694, ffll (1957). 
6 For a full discussion of the Korean episode, see Goodrich, "Korea-Collective Mea-
sures Against Aggression," INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION, No. 494, Carnegie '.Endowment for 
International Peace (Oct. 1953); Goodrich, "Efforts To '.Establish International Police 
Force Down to 1950," Appx. to FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 184-194 (1957). 
7 See text following note 30 infra. 
s U.N. Doc. A/3302, 1[12 (1956). "The Force, which has an international character as 
a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, as affirmed in its regulations, was not estab-
lished ,to undertake enforcement actions. While UNEF has a military organization, it does 
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ing on Egyptian territory depend entirely on the consent of Egypt.9 
Although the Emergency Force was authorized on a strictly 
temporary basis, the success which it has achieved in relieving an 
international crisis and restoring, temporarily at least, order in 
Gaza, Suez and the Sinai Peninsula10 has prompted support for 
the establishment of such a force on a permanent basis.11 Lebanon, 
Jordan, Kashmir12 and the Tunisian-Algerian border13 have all 
been the subje~ts of recent proposals for the stationing of a similar 
UN force. Such a force could also be used by the Security Council, 
for instance, in connection with Article 40 of the Charter under 
which the Council can call upon the parties to a dispute to comply 
with measures aimed at effecting a cease fire and which do not 
result in prejudice to either party.14 This article would be sub-
stantially more effective if a neutral force could ensure that a 
complying party will not suffer prejudice. 
The present force has already furnished experience that can 
be highly useful15 in creating a permanent or another ad hoc force; 
not use all normal military methods in achieving the objectives defined for it by the 
General Assembly ..•• [T]he functions foreseen for UNEF when the cease-fire was being 
established, were to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Govern-
ment, in order 'to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian 
troops.'" U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[31 (1957). 
9 U.N. Doc. A/3302, 1[9 (1956). 
10 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[1[30 to 34, 44, 45 (1957); statement of Joseph E. Johnson, Presi-
dent of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Hearings Before the Subcommit-
tee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, on 
H. Res. 367 and H. Con. Res. 373, .85th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 3-4 (1958). 
11 See Pearson, "Force for U,N.," 35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 395 (1957); FRYE, A UNITED 
NATIONS PEACE FORCE 66 et seq. (1957); Munro, "The Case for a Standing U.N. Army," 
NEW YoRK TIMES MAGAZINE, p. 8, July 27, 1958; Report of Mr. Carnahan from the Sub-
committee on Foreign Affairs, Relative to the Establishment of a United Nations Force, 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the 
Committee for Foreign Affairs on H. Res. 367 and H. Con. Res. 373, 85th Cong., 2d 
sess., p. 97 et seq. (1958); President Eisenhower's speech before the U.N. General Assembly 
on Aug. 13, 1958, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1958, p. 6:2; Secretary of State Dulles's speech 
before the Assembly on Sept. 18, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1958, p. 4:2. 
12 United Nations Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/3821 (1957). India has vehemently 
rejected the idea and warned that it would consider an offer to participate in such a 
force as "an unfriendly act.'' 3 U.N. CHRONICLE, col. 1003 (1957). 
13 The United States has favored the use of UN observers in that area. N .Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 12, 1958, §1, p. 12:3-4, but the proposal encountered considerable difficulty, 51 
NEWSWEEK, April 14, 1958, p. 42:3. 
14 See GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 273-276 (1949); Goon-
RICH AND SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE 
AND SECURITY 381 (1955). The Security Council could also invoke article 39 for this purpose 
on the theory that the force is a measure not involving the use of armed force (see article 
41) which is to be employed to give effect to a decision of the Council. 
15 The Secretary General designated a special committee of the Secretariat headed 
58 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57 
and this is especially true of its legal aspects. The purpose of this 
comment is to consider the legal status of UNEF and of a potential 
permanent force of the same type. Some of the incidental legal 
problems confronting the United Nations will also be considered. 
I. Basis in the Charter 
A detailed analysis of the constitutional basis of UNEF has 
already been the subject of able treatment16 and is beyond the 
scope of this comment. Some brief observations on this subject 
will nevertheless be useful in exploring the legal status of the force. 
UNEF is described, in terms of UN constitutional doctrine, as 
a subsidiary-6rgan of the General Assembly,17 functioning in ac-
cordance with the "Uniting for Peace" resolution.18 "Uniting for 
Peace" was the response of the General Assembly to the Security 
Council's failure to carry out its "primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security"19 in connection 
with the Korean episode.20 The resolution is a statement of policy 
that the Assembly shall consider on an emergency basis any threat 
to or breach of the peace or act of aggression and make recom-
mendations concerning it whenever lack of unanimity prevents 
the Security Council from exercising its primary responsibility.21 
The resolution thus explains the General Assembly's assumption 
of responsibility in the Suez crisis, but does not provide for the 
establishment of a UN force. 
The authority for organizing such a force is said to be found 
in Article 22 of the Charter which authorizes the Assembly to_ 
"establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for' the 
by Dr. Ralph Bunche -to make· a comprehensive analysis of all aspects of UNEF. 3 U.N. 
CHRONICLE, col. 990 (1957). 
16 See Sohn, "The Authority of the United Nations To Establish and Maintain a 
Permanent United Nations Force," 52 AM. J. INT. L. 229 (1958); Goodrich and Rosner, 
"TJie United Nations Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 (1957). 
11 U.N. Doc. A/3694, p. 12 (1957). 
18 Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the period Sept. 19 to Dec. 
15, 1950, U.N. GENERAL AssE!IIBLY OFF. REc., 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, U.N. Doc. A/1175, 
p. IO; U.N. Doc. A/3302, p. 4 (1956). 
19 U.N. CHARTER, art. 24. 
20 See note 6 supra. 
21 Concerning this resolution, see generally: 1 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRAC· 
TICE 306, 307 (1955); Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations," 32 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 97 at 156, 157 (1955-1956); GOODRICH AND SIMONS, 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY 408-
414 (1955); CHEEVER AND HAVILAND, ORGANIZING FOR PEACE 486-489 (1954); STONE, L!lGAL 
CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 266-278 (1954). 
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performance of its functions." This article is clearly limited by 
the scope of the Assembly's functions as they are defined elsewhere 
in the Charter.22 The provisions of the Charter and its drafting 
history indicate two limitations on the Assembly's authority to 
establish a UN force. The first is that the Assembly's functions 
are all stated in terms of discussion and recommendation, which 
reflects a distinction the drafters of the Charter sought to draw 
between the General Assembly, as a kind of "to-wn meeting of the 
world,"23 in contrast to the Security Council which was to exercise 
sole responsibility for taking action on behalf of the organization.24 
The second limitation is the incapacity of the Assembly (not 
shared by the Security Council) to impose a legally binding obliga-
tion upon the members in matters concerning the preservation of 
international peace.25 
The distinction between the Assembly as the organ of discus-
sion and the Council as the body responsible for action has not 
been carefully respected, however. The practice of the General 
Assembly contains several instances of what may be described as 
direct action on the part of the Assembly, e.g., its resolutions of 
February I [498(V)]26 and May 18, 1951 [500(V)]27 declaring 
Communist China an aggressor in Korea and urging an embargo 
against her, and the establishment of the Korean Reconstruction 
Agency in 1950.28 It is therefore generally accepted that the Assem-
bly had power to establish UNEF as a subsidiary organ of the 
General Assembly.29 
22 See GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 183-194 (1949), where 
it is stated at 193-194 with regard to subsidiary organs of the General Assembly: "Th·e 
basic rule for all such ,bodies is that their authority cannot exceed that of the General 
Assembly from which it is derived." But cf. Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations 
Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 at 417-419 (1957). 
23 Kll.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 199-200 (1950). 
24 GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 28, 150, 172-174 (1949). 
25 GOODRICH AND SIMONS, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATION-
AL PEACE AND SECURITY 428 (1955); Johnson, "The Effect of Resolutions of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations," 32 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 97 (1955-1956). 
26 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 224-225 (1951). 
27 Id. at 228. 
28 The Agent General of the Agency was directed "to carry out the recommendations 
of the General Assembly ••• .'' Res. 410 (V) A &: B, U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 
5th Sess., Supp. No. 20 (Doc. A/1775) pp. 31-35 (1950). Another such instance is the Com-
mission of Palestine established in 1947, Kll.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 195-196 
(1950). 
29 Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 413 (1957). Although UNEF is regarded in its entirety as a subsidiary organ 
of the General Assembly, it would also be possible for the Assembly to establish only a 
Command, and then recommend to the member states that they furnish troop contingents 
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The Soviet Union, which did not oppose the establishment of 
UNEF, purportedly because it was accepted by Egypt, has chal-
lenged its constitutionality on the ground that it is an illegal 
substitute for the forces prescribed in Article 43 of the Charter,30 
the only article expressly providing for UN forces. In that article 
all members of the United Nations undertake to make armed 
forces available to the Security Council on its call for the purpose 
of maintaining international peace and security. These forces were 
to be made available on the basis of special agreements between 
member states and the Security Council, but no such agreements 
have been concluded, and hence, no forces made available under 
Article 43 because the permanent members of the Security Council 
reached an early impasse over the principles which should govern 
the composition of any such forces.31 The Russian argument is 
unacceptable because of the basically different functions for which 
UNEF and Article 43 forces were designed. The latter were in-
tended to provide the Security Council with fighting forces capable 
of stopping any organized military aggression, whereas UNEF is 
not intended to impose the will of the United Nations on any na-
tion, but to assist both parties to a dispute in effectuating and 
preserving a cease fire. 
It is clear that even under a broad construction of its powers 
the General Assembly cannot obligate a member to accept a UN 
force on its territory, and the scope of its operations as well as the 
duration of its stay depend on the consent of the host state. Nor 
can the General Assembly obligate any member state to make 
available its troops for service with the force. However, it is a very 
different thing to say that the decision to establish the Force 
which would act in accordance with the recommendations of the UN Command. The 
difference is that under the latter plan, the troops would be acting as national units and 
their status would ,be determined solely by reference to the status of friendly foreign 
forces under international law (discussed infra). If, on the other hand, the troop con-
tingents constitute part of a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, they are entitled 
to the privileges and immunities of the United Nations under Article 105 of the Charter 
(discussed infra). 
ao Report of the Fifth Committee, U.N. GENERAL ASSEJ11BLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess. 
Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, p. 65, 1[25 (Doc. A/3560) (1957). 
31 Russia insisted that the contributions of all members be quantitatively and qualita-
tively equal. This would mean that no contribution could be stronger than that of the 
weakest member, and in view of the weakened condition of postwar Nationalist China, 
for example, the result would have been to limit the forces to token size. See Goodrich, 
"Efforts To Establish International Police Force Down to 1950," appx. to FRYE, A UNITED 
NATIONS PEACE FORCE 175-184 (1957); and 2 REPERTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 23-54 
(1955). 
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(assuming this to be otherwise valid under the Charter) and to 
recommend that members contribute military contingents is in 
any way dependent on the consent of the host state. Nevertheless, 
the Secretary General did not dispute the Indian position ( ex-
pressed as a condition of its contribution to UNEF): "It is under-
stood that the Force may have to function through Egyptian ter-
ritory. Therefore, there must be Egyptian consent for its establish-
ment."32 This qualification may seem unimportant since, in any 
event, a force cannot function without the consent of the host 
state. As a practical matter, however, the prior existence of a force 
could prove an important factor in obtaining this consent.33 No 
such limitation on the General Assembly's authority appears in 
the Charter either expressly or by reasonable inference. 
There are alternative methods of establishing a UN force. 
There is no legal obstacle to the establishment of a force by the 
Security Council34 if it should so desire. Another possibility is the 
establishment of a force as part of the Secretariat.35 The justifica-
tion for this may be found in Article 97 of the Charter which pro-
vides that the Secretariat "shall comprise ... such staff as the organ-
ization may require." This was the basis upon which the Secretary 
General established the United Nations Field Service, with the 
approval of the General Assembly, in 1949.36 The Field Service was 
established for the purpose of providing physical protection as well 
as technical services and facilities for UN missions37 and is now 
handling communications for UNEF.38 A Field Reserve Panel, 
which is nothing more than a list of qualified senior military per-
sonnel who can be called to service for supervision and observation 
work when needed,39 was established in conjunction with the Field 
Service but has not been utilized. These two agencies resulted from 
32 U.N. Doc. A/3302/Add. 4fRev. I, GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., First Emergency 
Special Sess. 23, 24 (1956). 
33 This consideration undoubtedly motivated the Indian stipulation. See note 12 
supra, and FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 7 (1957). 
34 Sohn, "The Authority of the United Nations To Establish and Maintain a Per-
manent United Nations Force," 52 AM. J. INT. L. 229 (1958). 
35 Id. at 235. 
36 YEARBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS 425 (1948-1949). 
37 U.N. GENERAL AssE?.IBLY OFF. ,REc., 4th Sess., Supp. No. I, Doc. A/930, pp. xiv 
to xv (1949); note 36 supra. 
38 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1fll (1957). 
39 U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 4th Sess., Supp. No. 13, Doc. A/959, p. 2 (1949); 
Schwebel, "A United Nations 'Guard' and a United Nations 'Legion,'" appx. to FRYE, 
A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 202, 203 (1957). 
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Trygvie Lie's proposal in 1948 for a UN Guard Force40 that would 
have performed essentially the same kind of functions as UNEF41 
• in addition to furnishing security for UN missions. If a permanent 
UN force is to be established in the near future there is something 
to be said in favor of doing so within the framework of the Secre-
tariat.42 Perhaps the most important consideration is that the cost 
of maintaining a standing force larger than current needs require 
would be prohibitive43 and since the present need is primarily for 
advance planning of administrative and legal arrangements,44 any 
successful proposal for a permanent force is likely to result in no 
more than institution of the needed administrative machinery.45 
The Field Service and Reserve Panel, which serve closely related 
functions, are a part of the Secretariat, and efficient administration 
would favor consolidation of these agencies. Moreover, as part of 
the Secretariat, the Force could more easily recruit its personnel 
directly and there would be no question that every member thereof 
is an agent of the United Nations rather than his national state.46 
Of course there may be considerable political difficulties in obtain-
ing an agreement in the UN on such direct recruitment. 
II. Legal Status 
The status of UNEF concerns its relation to the sovereign of 
. the territory in which it is functioning. We have already observed 
that the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt are premised 
on that government's consent, from which it follows that the Force 
would be obligated to remove itself from Egyptian territory if that 
government should so demand.47 The following discussion is ad-
dressed to the status of the Force while it is present and functioning 
pursuant to the consent of the host state. 
40 Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. 
GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 3d s~ .. Supp. No. 1, Doc. A/565, pp. xvii to xviii (1948); 
for the text of the proposal see U.N. Doc. A/656 (1948). · 
41 See FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 32-45 (1957). 
42 This is envisaged by Secretary of State Dulles's proposal, N .Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 
1958, p. 4:2. 
43 Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations Emergency Force," 11 INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATION 413 at 429 (1957); FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FORCE 72, 73 (1957). 
44 FRYE, A UNITED NATIONS PEACE FoRCE 81 et seq. (1957); Pearson, "Force for U.N.," 
35 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 395, 401, 402 (1957). 
45 See speech by Sir Leslie Munro, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1957, §1, p. 19:2, (Late City 
Edition). 
46 See note 29 supra. 
47 Note 9 supra. 
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In considering the status of UNEF, it is important to keep in 
mind its two most important characteristics: (a) it is a subsidiary 
organ of the General Assembly, and thus an agency of the 
United Nations; and (b) it is military in nature, its personnel 
consisting almost entirely of units of the regular armed forces of 
UN member states. The relations between UNEF and Egypt are 
regulated by a specific agreement concluded between the Secretary 
General and the Egyptian Foreign Minister,48 and approved by 
the General Assembly.49 Before examining the provisions of this 
agreement, it will be useful to consider the factors that would 
govern the status of the Force in the absence of a specific agree-
ment. This was in effect the circumstance in which UNEF func-
tioned during the first two months of its operation prior to the 
conclusion of the agreement.50 
A. Factors Influencing the Status of the Force. Rules and prac-
tices relevant to this question may be derived from three sources. 
(I) The first is found in Articles 104 and 10551 of the UN Charter 
and the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations,52 proffered by the General Assembly thereunder, 
in other Charter provisions and in the rules that have developed 
in the application thereof. (2) A second source may be found in the 
customary rules of international law concerning state responsibility 
as applied to international organizations (particularly the UN), and 
in the. practices that have been developed in connection with UN 
observer and truce supervision groups such as those which have 
functioned on various occasions in Palestine, Greece and Pakistan. 
(3) Also of considerable importance is customary international law 
48 Report of the Secretary General on arrangements concerning the status of the 
United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt, U,N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess., 
Annexes, Agenda Item No. 66, p. 52 (Doc. A/3526) (1957), hereinafter cited as UNEF 
Agreement. 
40 Res. 1126 (XI), U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess., Annexes, Agenda 
Item 66 at 76 (Doc. AjRes/485) (1957). The agreement is summarized and discussed 
briefly by Goodrich and Rosner, "The United Nations Emergency Force," II INTERNA-
TIONAL ORGANIZATION 413 at 425, 426 (1957). 
50 From the time UNEF first entered Egypt in November 1956 until the status agree-
ment was concluded on February 8, 1957, the only specific agreement concerning its 
status was an aide-memoire between the Secretary General and the Egyptian Government 
which called for a more detailed agreement and required all parties to act in good faith 
until it could be concluded. U.N. Doc. A/3375, p. 9, IO (1956), approved by the General 
Assembly in Res. 1121 (XI), U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 11th Sess., Annexes, 
Agenda Item 66, p. 75 (Doc. AfRes/411) (1956-1957). 
51 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL I.AW 206 at 222 (1957). 
52 Resolutions Adopted During the First Part of its First Session, U.N. GENERAL 
AssEMBLY OFF. REc. 25 to 27, Doc. A/64 (1946); 43 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. I (1949). 
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as well as the provisions of recent multilateral treaties, bearing 
upon the status of friendly military forces while stationed on 
foreign soil. 
Privileges, Immunities and Rights of the United Nations. Ar-
ticle 105 of the UN Charter provides: "(l) The Organization shall 
enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such privileges and 
immunities as are necessary for the fulfillment of its purposes," and 
"(2) ... officials of the Organization shall similarly enjoy such 
privileges and immunities as are necessary for the independent 
exercise of their functions in connection with the Organization." 
This article rejects the notion, contended for by some governments, 
that an international organization is entitled to the privileges, 
exemptions and immunities accorded foreign governments under 
customary international law, and that officials of such organizations 
should enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities.53 The prin-
ciple adopted by Article 105, which has been cited as declaratory 
of customary international law, 54 is that the privileges of the organ-
ization and its officials should be limited to what is necessary for 
the carrying out of their functions. 
This general principle leaves unanswered all of the difficult 
questions that arise in its practical application. It was for . this 
reason that Article 105 specifically empowered the General Assem-
bly to make recommendations or propose conventions "with a 
view to determining the details of the application of paragraphs 1 
and 2 of [Article 105]." In accordance with this provision, in 1946 
the General Assembly proposed the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities of the United Nations, which has been accepted by 
some (including Egypt)55 but not all (e.g., the United States)56 of 
the members. 
This Convention grants "the United Nations, its property and 
assets wherever located and by whomsoever held" immunity "from 
every form of legal process" except where expressly waived, and no 
53 See Preuss, "The International Organizations Immunities Act," 40 AM. J. INT. L. 
332 (1946). 
54 Ibid. 
55 U.N. Doc. A/64, 25-34 (1946). 
56 Congress enacted the International Organizations Immunities Act, 59 Stat. 669 
(1945), 22 U.S.C. (1952) §288, which serves the same purpose but is less favorable to the 
UN ,than the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. See Preuss, "The International 
Organizations Immunities Act," 40 AM. J. INT. L. 332 (1946). The United States also 
concluded a Headquarters Agreement with the United Nations, 61 Stat. 3416, in force 
Nov. 21, 1947, 61 Stat. 756. See also 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1300 (1958). 
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waiver of immunity shall extend to any measure of execution." 
The premises and archives of the United Nations are declared 
inviolable. Its assets, income and other property are exempt from 
direct taxes and customs duties and regulations. The privileges 
accorded its communications and correspondence may be generally 
described as those accorded diplomatic communications.57 UN 
personnel are accorded varying privileges in accordance with their 
rank and duties. Several of these provisions have been incorporated 
into the UNEF status agreement and will be noted in that 
connection. 
Under international law a state has the duty to observe a certain 
minimum standard in its treatment of foreign nationals on its soil. 
Private persons have no standing to complain of a breach of such 
duty and are dependent on their national states to press an inter-
national claim for them. Although Article 104 grants the United 
Nations Organization legal capacity in the sense that it can make 
contracts and bring suit in national courts, the Charter does not 
specifically confer international personality58 on the organization, 
which it must have if it is to press an international claim. The 
International Court of Justice filled this gap by inferring from the 
Charter as a whole that the organization has sufficient international 
personality for this purpose,59 so that the UN may protect the 
rights of its agents just as a state safeguards the interests of its 
citizens. 
The status accorded to UN observer and truce supervision 
groups is clearly pertinent in determining the status of an inter-
national force. A host state's duty to furnish personal protection 
for officials of such groups is illustrative. The government which 
is in control of territory in which UN officials carry out their 
functions, and which furnishes them personal protection, may be 
held responsible for their safety. These were the principal grounds 
on which Israel was held responsible in damages for the assassin-
ation on Israeli-controlled territory60 of UN truce mediator Count 
Bernadotte. 61 
57 GOODRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 522 (1949). 
58 "This Article [104] does not deal with what is called the 'international personality' 
of the Organization .... Practice will bring about the evolution of appropriate rules so 
far as necessary." Dept. of State, Conference Series 71, pp. 157, 158 (1945). 
59 "Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations," Advisory 
Opinion, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174. 
60 43 AM. J. !NT. L. 95 (1949). 
61 Count Bernadotte was in charge of "a multinational uniformed police group ••• 
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Status of Friendly Foreign Forces Under International Law.62 
In view of the predominantly military character of UNEF's per-
sonnel, the status of friendly foreign armed forces in international 
law is especially relevant. This matter has been of increasing 
importance since World War I and is currently posed by the large 
numbers of such troops in Europe under the NATO and Warsaw 
Pacts and in Japan. There is support for the proposition that under 
customary international law, when a sovereign consents to the pas-
sage or sojourn of a foreign force, it impliedly concedes that force 
such freedom from local restraints and controls as is needed to 
carry out the purposes for which the presence of such forces is 
intended. 63 This standard is too general to be of much practical 
value and in most instances where there have been sufficient forces 
to make the question important, a specific agreement has either 
been concluded64 or sought in negotiations.65 Although some of the 
major powers have been able to secure exclusive jurisdiction over 
their forces in wartime,66 the most important treaties since World 
War II, viz., those regulating the status of NATO and Warsaw 
Pact forces, have tended to emphasize concurrent jurisdiction,67 
consisting initially of about 50 UN guards ... as aides to the military observers of the 
truce ordered by the Security Council." "The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)," 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE 6 (1957). 
62 See generally: 32 N.Y. UNIV. L. R.Ev. 351 (1957); 70 HARV. L. REv. 1043 (1957); 
Schwartz, "International Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement," 53 CoL. L. 
REv. 1091 (1953); Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction," 
27 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 186 (1950); Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity from 
Supervisory Jurisdiction," 26 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 380 (1949); King, "Further Developments 
Concerning Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Forces," 40 AM. J. INT. L. 257 (1946); 
Brinton, "Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt," 38 AM. J. INT. L. 375 
(1944); King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," 36 AM. J. INT. L. 539 
(1942); 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW §169, p. 393 (1941). 
63 Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Supervisory Jurisdiction," 26 
BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 380 at 411-413 (1949); King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign 
Armed Forces," 36 AM. J. INT. L. 539 at 548 (1942); 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 393 (1949). 
64 For collection and discussion of such treaties, see Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: 
Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction," 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 186 at 187-207 (1950); 
Schwartz, "International Law and the NATO Status of Forces Agreement," 53 CoL. L. 
REv. 1091 at 1094-1102 (1953). 
65 In World War I the United States and Britain were negotiating for an agreement 
when the Armistice intervened, King, "Jurisdiction Over Friendly Foreign Armed Forces," 
36 AM. J. INT. L. 539 at 552, 553 (1942). 
66 Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal Jurisdiction,'' 27 BRIT. 
Y. B. INT. L. 186 at 199-205 (1950). The United States had agreements conferring immunity 
on U.S. forces in World War II with Belgium (respecting the Belgian Congo), Canada, 
China, Egypt, India, and New Zealand. Id. at 200. 
67 70 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1043 at 1049 (1957). 
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with a formula of primary rights to its exercise, depending on the 
relative interests of the sending and receiving states.68 
The foregoing precedents furnish the principles from which 
UNEF's status would have to be inferred in the absence of a 
specific agreement, and from which the provisions of the agreement 
presently governing the Force have been derived. 
B. The UNEF Status Agreement. The Status Agreement is 
premised on the conception that the entire Emergency Force is an 
organ of the United Nations. Par?graph 23 states that "the United 
Nations Emergency Force, as a subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations established by the General Assembly, enjoys the status, 
privileges and immunities of the United Nations." Evidence 
that the contributing states are not acting in their national capaci-
ties under recommendations of the General Assembly, but are to 
be treated as a constituent part of a subsidiary organ is found in the 
provision which extends the immunities of the United Nations 
under the Convention on Privileges and Immunities to "the prop-
erty, funds and assets of Participating States used in Egypt in 
connection with the national contingents serving in the United 
Nations Emergency Force."69 
In addition to the status agreement, UNEF is governed by a 
set of regulations issued by the Secretary General.7° Regulation 15 
provides that the Secretary General "shall have authority for all 
administrative, executive and financial matters affecting the Force 
and shall be responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of 
agreements with Governments concerning the Force." The Com-
mander, who is appointed by the General Assembly,71 is given 
"full command authority over the Force" and "is operationally 
responsible for the performance of all functions assigned to the 
Force by the United Nations."72 Regulation 12 provides that "in-
structions from principal organs of the United Nations shall be 
channeled by the Secretary General through the Commander and 
the Chain of Command designated by him."73 
68 NATO SOF, art. VII, U3; Schwartz, "International Law and the NATO Status of 
Forces Agreement," 53 CoL. L. REv. 1091 at 1092, n. 4 (1953). 
60 UNEF Agreement, U23 (note 48 supra). 
70 Regulations for the United Nations Emergency Force, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/UNEF/ 
1(1957), hereinafter cited: UNEF Regulation. These were issued after consultation with 
the UNEF Advisory Committee. 
71 Note 4 supra. 
72 UNEF Regulation 11. 
73 In designating ·the chain of command, the Commander is to make use of "the 
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(1) Powers and privileges. It has already been noted that the 
Force is "in no way a military force temporarily controlling the 
territory in which it is stationed."74 Nevertheless, it is essential to 
the successful functioning of the Force that it exercise some con-
trol over the buffer zone in which it operates. Thus, the Force is 
permitted to carry small arms, and has limited authority over indi-
viduals. The Secretary General reports that "UNEF is authorized 
to apprehend infiltrators [along the Israeli-Egyptian armistice line] 
and ... accepted practice is for UNEF to take infiltrators into cus-
tody in a zone extending 500 metres from the Demarcation Line, 
and hand them over to the local police."75 However, UNEF has not 
yet been able to obtain authority "to fire during darkness at infiltra-
tors approaching the line from either direction, which would be 
somewhat broader than its unquestioned right to fire in self 
defense-a right which it has, on occasion, exercised .... "76 
The Force is given rights to and definite powers over its en-
campments. Egypt is bound to provide the Force with necessary 
premises, which, "without prejudice to the fact that all such prem-
ises remain Egyptian territory" are inviolable and subject to the 
exclusive authority of the Commander.77 The qualification regard-
ing Egyptian territory, which is a paraphrase of a similar provision 
in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1936,78 serves a political pur-
pose but is legally redundant. The obligations of Egypt respecting 
the premises of the Force are somewhat broader than the NATO 
agreement under which the authorities of the receiving state 
assume "sole responsibility for making suitable arrangements to 
make available to a force or a civilian component the buildings 
and grounds which it requires, as well as facilities and services 
connected therewith;"79 but does not declare premises of the 
officers of the United Nations Command and the Commanders of the national contingents 
made available by Participating Governments." UNEF Regulation 12. 
74 Note 8 supra. 
75 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1f38. 
76 Id., 1f 44. 
77 UNEF Agreement, 1f19. 
78 Art. 5, U.K.T.S. 1937 No. 6, p. 24. The new (1957) Russian agreements with 
Poland, 52 AM. J. INT. L. 211; East Germany, 52 AM. J. INT. L. 210, and Hungary, 52 
AM. J. INT. L. 215, state in the first article that the "temporary presence" of Soviet troops 
is without prejudice to the sovereignty of the receiving state and that they will not inter-
fere in the internal affairs of that state. 
79 NATO SOF, art. IX, 1f3. Paragraph 34 of the UNEF Agreement entitles the force 
to the use of public utilities at rates not less favorable than those to comparable con-
sumers. In case of interruption of service, the Force will receive the same priority as 
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forces inviolable. Military police of the Force are authorized to 
take into custody any person on the premises of the Force for 
the purpose of turning him over immediately to the nearest ap-
propriate Egyptian authorities "(a) when so requested by the 
Egyptian authorities; or (b) for the purpose of dealing with any 
offence or disturbance on the premises."80 
In .addition to these powers, UNEF enjoys a number of 
privileges designed to enhance its effectiveness in carrying out 
its mission. Members of UNEF, like NATO forces,81 are exempt 
from passport, visa and immigration restrictions on entering or 
departing from the receiving state, being required to show only 
personal identification and individual or collective movement 
orders.82 
UNEF is assured "freedom of movement between Force head-
quarters, camps and other premises, within the area of operations,8~ 
and to and from points of access to Egyptian territory agreed upon 
or to be agreed upon by the Egyptian Government and the 
Commander."84 
The Egyptian authorities are to supply the force with informa-
tion which may be useful in facilitating its movements; and "the 
Government of Egypt recognizes the right of the Force and its 
essential government services. The Force has the right to generate electricity on its 
premises and to transmit and distribute it as needed. 
so UNEF Agreement, 1fl5; NATO SOF, art. VII, 1f5 obligates the authorities of the 
sending and receiving states to assist each other in arresting members of the force or its 
civilian component but is not specific with regard to arrest of local citizens on the 
premises of the forces. Art. VII, 1flO(a) authorizes the force to police its camps, although 
all of 1fl0 appears to be directed toward control of members of the force. 
81 NATO SOF, art. III. 
82 UNEF Agreement, 1f7. 
83" 'Area of operations' includes areas where the Force is deployed in the per• 
formance of its functions as defined in paragraph 12 of the second and final report of 
the Secretary General to the General Assembly ... [see note 85 infra] military installa-
tions or other premises . . . [which are "such areas for headquarters, camps, or other 
premises as may be necessary for the accommodation and fulfillment of the functions of 
the Force," UNEF Agreement, 1f19] •.. and· lines of communication and supply utilized 
pursuant to paragraphs 32 and 33 .... " UNEF Agreement, 1f5. 
84 UNEF Agreement, 1f32. Paragraph 33 gives the Force "the right to the use of roads, 
bridges, canals and other waters, port facilities and airfields without the payment of 
dues, tolls or charges by way of registration or otherwise in the area of operations and 
the normal points of access, except for charges that are related directly to services ren-
dered." This matter is not specifically dealt with in the NATO agreement. Article IV 
thereof requires the receiving state to accept a driving license or permit of the sending 
state or issue one of its own without requiring a driving test or fee. The UNEF agreement 
does not mention driving licenses or permits specifically. Members of the Force are to 
receive "the most favorable consideration" to requests for traveling facilities on railways 
and fare concessions. Art. IX, 1f6 of NATO SOF is to the same effect. 
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members to freedom of movement across armistice demarcation 
lines in the performance of the functions85 of the Force."86 This 
latter proviso points up one of the problems that has confronted 
UNEF. Israel has not consented to the admission of the Force on 
her side of the Is~aeli-Egyptian Armistice line of 1949 which 
UNEF is now policing. Since the 'status agreement is between only 
the United Nations and Egypt, the Force still lacks the consent 
of lsrael87 which is necessary before it can be stationed on that 
nation's side of the line. 
UNEF is granted diplomatic privileges for its communica-
tions, 88 which is a clear illustration of the impact of the inter-
national character of the Force on its status. No such extensive 
privilege is found in other status of forces agreements. 
The agreement confers a number of economic privileges on 
the Force. It may obtain equipment, services and supplies from 
local sources, and upon request of the Commander, Egyptian 
authorities ar!=! to assist the Force in so doing.89 Sympathetic con-
sideration is to be given by the Commander to requests and ob-
servations of the Egyptian authorities so as to avoid any adverse 
effect on the local economy. Members of the Force may purchase 
goods for their own use "under conditions not less favorable than 
for Egyptian citizens."90 
85 See note 5 supra. The functions of the Force as defined by the Secretary General 
[U.N. Doc. A/3302, 1fl2 (1956)] and incorporated in 1f5 of the status agreement, note 
48 supra, are: " .•. when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with 
the consent of the Egyptian Government in order to maintain quiet during and after 
the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the resolution of 
2 November 1956 ... " and sustained by the General Assembly in resolution 1000 (ES-I) 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REC., First Emergency Special Sess., Supp. No. I, Doc. A/3354 
(1956). This original purpose of the Force has long since been accomplished and it has 
taken up the additional function of policing the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement, 
"The United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF)," INTERNATIONAL REVIEW SERVICE 1,2 
(1957); U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1fl[30 to 34 (1957). 
86 UNEF Agreement, 1f 32, p. 56. 
87 Israel has not consented to the operation of UNEF on its soil, U.N. Doc. A/3694, 
1f15 (1957). 
88 UNEF Agreement, 1f\[29 to 31. Article III of the Convention on Privileges and 
Immunities assures the Organization no less favorable treatment for communications than 
that accorded to any other government by the host state, including diplomatc missions. 
There can be no censorship, and couriers get diplomatic privileges and immunities. 
43 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. I at 3 (1949), 
89 UNEF Agreement, 1f1f36, 37, p. 56; art. IX, 1f4 of NATO SOF gives the local 
authorities greater control over the employment of local personnel. 
ll0 UNEF Agreement, 1f37, p. 56. Comparable provisions appear in art. IX, 1f1fl and 2 
of NATO SOF but are slightly more restrictive, reflecting the more significant purchases 
by civilian components of those forces. UNEF Regulation 41 prohibits accompaniment by 
families except where expressly authorized by the Commander. 
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The terms of the UNEF agreement give the Force more lat-
itude in the employment of local personnel than the NATO Status 
of Forces Agreement. UNEF may recruit local personnel, giving 
sympathetic consideration to avoiding any adverse effect on the 
local economy and, although to the extent practicable the terms 
and conditions of employment are to follow the practice prevailing 
in the community, these may be prescribed by the Commander.91 
The NATO agreement provides that conditions of employment, 
including "wages, supplementary payments and conditions for the 
protection of workers, shall be those laid down by the legislation 
of the receiving state."92 The most remarkable provision in the 
UNEF agreement is that "disputes concerning the terms of em-
ployment and conditions of service of locally recruited personnel 
shall be settled by administrative procedure to be established by 
the Commander,"93 and this provision, in view of its affirmative 
language, appears to be exclusive.94 
(2) Immunities. The UNEF agreement contains an article com-
mon to other status agreements95 which states that the Force and 
UN officials serving with it shall respect the laws and regulations 
of Egypt and refrain from any activity of a political character. 
In recognition of the unusual role of the Force, its members and 
United Nations officials serving with it must refrain "from any 
action incompatible with the international nature of their 
duties .... "96 The purpose of the immunities granted the Force 
and its members is expressed in paragraph IO of the agreement as 
"having regard to the special functions of the Force and to the 
interests of the United Nations, and not for the personal benefit 
of the members of the Force." 
(a) Criminal jurisdiction. The Commander is required to take 
all appropriate measures to ensure observance of the foregoing 
obligations97 and to maintain discipline and good order among 
members of the Force.98 With respect to criminal jurisdiction, the 
91 UNEF Agreement, fl37 and UNEF Regulation 19(c). 
92NATO SOF, art. IX, fl4. 
93 UNEF Agreement fl38(c), p. 56. Article 38 provides that "Disputes or claims of 
a private law character shall be settled in accordance with . . . [its] • . . provisions." 
94 If disputes should arise between Egypt and the United Nations in this connection, 
the arbitration procedures of fl40 (discussed infra) would be available. 
95 E.g., NATO SOF, art. II; Poland, 52 AM. J. INT. L. 211, art. 3. 
96 UNEF Agreement, fl6, p. 53. 
97Ibid. 
98 UNEF Agreement, fll4. 
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agreement provides: "Members of the Force shall be subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national States in respect 
of any criminal offenses which may be committed by them in 
Egypt. "99 . 
This provision is particularly favorable to UNEF. Absolute 
immunity has been the exception rather than the rule both in 
customary international law and by treaty.100 The UNEF agree-
ment does not even contain a provision calling for friendly or 
favorable consideration of a request for waiver of the sending 
state's exclusive jurisdiction.101 Good reason for this favorable 
treatment may be found, first, in the fact that UNEF, as its name 
implies, entered Egypt to perform emergency services, more anal-
ogous to wartime conditions than those under which the NATO 
and Warsaw Pact Forces are stationed. Secondly, there is a greater 
emphasis on the temporary character of UNEF's stay than in most 
other status situations. A third and significant factor is UNEF's 
character as an organ of the UN, representing worldwide, rather 
than merely national or regional interests. 
It is common for status agreements to contain some provision 
for arrest by either state and surrender of custody to whichever 
state will exercise jurisdiction and to require prompt notice by the 
arresting state.102 · The UNEF agreement defines the receiving 
state's authority a little more closely than the NATO agreement.103 
Egyptian authorities may take a member of the Force into custody 
and deliver him to the nearest appropriate authorities of the Force 
if the Commander so requests or "the military police of the Force 
are unable to act with the necessary promptness when a member 
99 Id., 1[11, p. 53. 
100 See notes 63 and 67 supra. 
101 The NATO SOF contains no such provision where either party has exclusive 
jurisdiction, but does so stipulate where jurisdiction is concurrent [art. VII, 1[3(c)]. The 
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations makes the Secretary 
General responsible for waiving the immunity of any official where, "in his opinion the 
immunity would impede the course of justice and can be waived without prejudice to 
the interests of the United Nations." 43 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. I at 5 (1949), art. V, §20. 
Article V is made applicable to members of the Secretariat attached to UNEF and these 
people appear to be the only persons connected with the Force to which a specific waiver 
provision is applicable, in this case by incorporation. No reason_ appears for isolating 
members of· the Secretariat for special treatment in this regard and the arrangements 
ought to be more clear on this point. 
102 See NATO SOF, art. VII, 1[5. 
103 NATO SOF, art. VII, 1[9(a): "The authorities of the receiving and sending States 
shall assist each other in the arrest of -members of a force or civilian component . . • 
and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction. . . ." 
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... is apprehended in the commission or attempted commission 
of a criminal offense that results or might result in serious injury 
to persons or property, or serious impairment of other legally 
protected rights."104 He may be subjected to a preliminary inter-
rogation by the Egyptian authorities, but the transfer of custody 
to the Force may not be delayed. Following transfer of custody, 
the person concerned is to be made available for further inter-
rogation by the arresting authority.105 
(b) Civil jurisdiction. The comparative treatment of the several 
types of UNEF personnel with regard to immunity from civil 
jurisdiction is perhaps the best illustration of the hybrid nature 
of the Force. The Commander and his family are entitled to 
privileges, immunities and facilities under the Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, which include, 
inter alia, "the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facil-
ities accorded to diplomatic envoys, in accordance with interna-
tional law."100 Officers of the Command (the Commander's Head-
quarters staff) enjoy the privileges and immunities accorded by 
the Convention to experts on missions for the United Nations, 
which are those "necessary for the independent exercise of their 
functions."107 Members of the Secretariat attached to the Force 
and their families retain their privileges as "officials of the United 
Nations" under Articles V and VII108 of the Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities, with the exception of local personnel, 
whose immunity is limited to their official acts.109 
In addition to these special cases, it is generally provided that 
members of the Force are not subject to the civil jurisdiction of 
the Egyptian courts in any matter relating to their official duties110 
and the factual determination as to whether a matter relates to 
the official duties of a member is to be made by the UNEF Com-
104 UNEF Agreement, 1[16, p. 54. 
105 Id., 1[17, p. 54. 
100 Id., 1[25, p. 55. 
1071bid. 
108 Article V of the Convention grants various immunities, including immunity for 
words uttered or acts done in an official capacity, exemption for pay, freedom from 
national service obligations and extends immigration benefits to dependent relatives. 
Article VII grants privileges for the purpose of expediting travel. 
100 This is the principle of "nationality discrimination," based on the theory that 
the only reason for granting a local citizen immunity is for his actions in an official 
capacity for the Organization. Preuss, "The International Organizations Immunities Act," 
40 AM. J. INT. L. 332 at 337 (1946). 
110 UNEF Agreement, 1[12(a), p. 53. 
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mander.111 If a matter does not relate to a member's official duties 
so that civil jurisdiction may be exercised by the Egyptian courts, 
"the Egyptian courts and authorities_ shall grant members of the 
Force sufficient opportunity to safeguard their rights."112 The 
substance of the rights referred to must be determined by reference 
to the requirements of customary international law.113 The NATO 
agreement is much more specific in this regard, listing several 
specific rights114 designed to assure defendants, in part, what 
Americans would describe as due process of law. At least some 
of these rights would not be necessarily included in the protection 
accorded by customary international law. If, on the other hand, a 
matter does relate to a member's official duties the claim is handled 
in the manner set out in the section on settlement procedures 
(below). 
Provision is also made for satisfaction of judgments.115 Property 
of a member of the Force may be seized for "the satisfaction of 
a judgment, decision or order" subject to two exceptions: (1) 
property which is certified by the Commander to be needed by 
him for the fulfillment of his official duties and (2) property 
exempt under Egyptian law. The personal liberty of a member of 
the Force cannot be restricted in a civil proceeding for any reason. 
If "a claim adjudicated or an award made in favour of the claimant 
by an Egyptian court or the Claims Commission ... has not been 
111 UNEF Agreement, 1fl3, p. 54. Several Egyptian decisions in World War II refused 
to give conclusive effect to official declarations or certificates of military commanders 
concerning the question whether the criminal offender was at the time engaged in 
service commande. Brinton, "Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt," 38 
AM. J. INT. L. 375 at 382 (1944). Article 4 of the Treaty of London (1936) between Great 
Britain and Egypt, U.K.T.S. iNo. 6, p. 24 (1937) applied the official duties test only to 
cases of civil jurisdiction. Barton, "Foreign Armed Forces: Immunity From Criminal 
Jurisdiction," 27 BRIT. Y. B. INT. L. 186 at 194, 195 (1950). The determination of whether 
a given act related to a member's official duties was reserved to the British Ambassador. 
Brinton, "Jurisdiction Over Members of Allied Forces in Egypt," 38 AM. J. INT. L. 375 at 
378 (1944). 
112 UNEF Agreement, 1fl2(b), p. 53. 
113 See BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW 473, 474, 487-496 (1953). 
114 NATO SOF, art. VII, 1f9 entitles members of visiting forces "(a) to a prompt and 
speedy trial; Q>) to be informed, in advance, of the specific charge or charges made against 
him; (c) to be confronted with the witnesses against -him; (d) to have compulsory process 
for obtaining witnesses in his favour ... ; (e) to :have legal representation of his own 
choice .•. under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving State; 
(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and (g) to 
communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and, when 
the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial." 
115 UNEF Agreement, 1fl2(b), (c), pp. 53, 54. Paragraph 12(b) states that the exempted 
categories shall be free from seizure. 
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satisfied, the Egyptian authorities may, without prejudice to the 
claimant's rights, seek the good offices of the Secretary General to 
obtain satisfaction."116 The only civil immunity accorded NA TO 
forces is from proceedings to enforce a judgment against a mem-
ber in a matter arising from the performance of his official duties.117 
In addition, the Secretary General's Regulations provide that 
"Members of the Force are entitled to the legal protection of the 
United Nations and shall be regarded as agents" thereof for pur-
poses of this protection.118 This suggests the advisory opinion of 
the International Court of Justice119 that the United Nations could 
bring an international claim not only for damage to itself, but also 
(with some dissent) for injuries to the particular agent of the UN, 
on the theory that the agent should be assured of protection by 
the organization, rather than be required to turn to his national 
state to press an international claim for him. The policy considera-
tion in favor of this conclusion is that it relieves an international 
servant from dependence on his own state where an international 
claim is to be allowed on his behalf.120 
All members of UNEF are exempt from taxes121 on pay re-
ceived from their national states or the UN and from all other 
direct taxes except municipal rates for services enjoyed,122 and can 
import free of duty all personal effects. Any personal property "not 
required of them by reason of their presence in Egypt with the 
Force" is subject to customs and exchange regulations,123 however. 
(3) Settlement procedures. The agreement is fairly detailed in 
this respect. The International Court of Justice, a special claims 
commission and an arbitral tribunal are availed of for these 
purposes. 
116 Id., ffl2(c), p. 51. 
117 NATO SOF, art. VIII, ffff9 and 5(g), art. XI, ffl. 
118 UNEF Regulation 30. 
119 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 174. 
120 Id. at 183, 184. 
121 UNEF Agreement, ff26. Article X of NATO SOF is similar in effect. Neither 
agreement immunizes members from taxes on purchases of goods or services. See NATO 
SOF, Art. IX, ff8. 
122 Section 7(a) if the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations 
is to the same effect. The exception from immunity for taxes which are in fact a charge 
for services is common. 
123 NATO SOF, art. XI, ffff5, 6 and 7 accord NATO members the same privilege. 
Imported articles subject to customs duties for failure to meet the requirements of 
immunity are also subject to direct taxes under the last sentence of art. X, ffl, but 
apparently not under the NATO provision which confers immunity from all direct taxes 
except those which are charges for services enjoyed. 
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(a) Claims commission. The Commission is composed of three 
persons, the Secretary General and Egyptian Government each 
appointing one, and a Chairman jointly.124 The most important 
function of the Claims Commission is to hear claims brought by 
a citizen or the government of Egypt against a member of the 
Force which relate to a matter in connection with his official duties. 
The Claims Commission will also settle claims by Egypt or the 
United Nations against each other unless the question involves 
an interpretation of the status agreement, in which case the matter 
is to be decided by an arbitral tribunal in accordance with para-
graph 40.125 The agreement simply states that such claims are to 
be "settled" by the Commission, but does not specifically state 
that its decision is final and binding. 
(b) Arbitral tribunal. Paragraph 40 of the agreement provides 
that disputes between the United Nations and Egypt concerning 
the "interpretation or application" of the status agreement, and 
not settled by negotiation "or other agreed mode of settlement" 
are to be referred for final settlement to an arbitral tribunal126 
which, like the Claims Commission, is to consist of three persons, 
the Secretary General and Egypt to choose one apiece and an 
umpire jointly. Provision is also made to assure that neither party 
can block the arbitral process by refusing to participate or appoint 
a representative such as occurred in connection with the alleged 
violations of human rights under the Peace Treaties of 194 7 
respecting Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania.127 If the parties can-
not agree on an umpire within one month of the proposal for 
arbitration by one of the parties, "the President of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice shall be asked by either party to appoint 
the umpire." The tribunal will come into existence on appoint-
ment of the umpire and at least one other member of the tribunal 
and two members constitute a quorum, a favorable vote by two 
members being sufficient for all ·decisions thereof. Thus, it is im-
124 UNEF Agreement, 1[38, p. 56. 
125 Id., 1[1[38 and 40, pp. 56, 57. Article XVI of NATO SOF requires that all dif-
ferences "relating to the interpretation or application" of that agreement be settled 
"by negotiation ,between them without recourse to any outside jurisdiction." 
126 The question whether a dispute concerns the "interpretation or application" 
of the status agreement, and hence, whether" the Claims Commission or the Arbitral 
Tribunal has jurisdiction should be decided by the Arbitral Tribunal since such a 
question involves interpretation and application of the words "concerning the interpreta-
tion or application of these arrangements" in paragraph 40. 
127 See BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAw 59-61 (1953). 
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possible for one party to prevent arbitration by refusing to co-
operate in setting up the commission. 
(c) International Court of Justice. Should a dispute arise over 
the interpretation of any of the provisions of the Convention on 
Privileges and Immunities incorporated in the agreement, the 
question is to be submitted to the International Court of Justice 
for an advisory opinion which shall be accepted as binding.128 
The UNEF status agreement is a response to a novel legal 
development on the international scene. It has skillfully taken 
account of the hybrid nature of the Force which is part military 
and in part like other international observer groups and truce 
supervision teams. The independence of the Force has been care-
fully guarded on the basis of a functional approach to the question 
of privileges and immunities. Although the agreement reiterates 
the proposition that UNEF is a "subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations" the special privileges and immunities accorded that 
organization and its personnel are not extended to the military 
elements of the Force, which are treated with due regard to their 
character as friendly foreign military personnel. The more favor-
able treatment accorded these UNEF military personnel as com-
pared with current status-of-forces agreements such as those of 
NATO and Japan can be explained by the greater urgency under 
which UNEF entered Egypt, the comparatively greater emphasis 
on the temporary character of its stay, and the international 
character of this Force. 
It should be noted, however, that the present arrangements 
were concluded with only one party to the controversy, since Israel 
has refused to admit the Force on its side of the armistice line.129 
Looking to the future, the very nature of a UNEF-type force makes 
it most useful in situations where there is friction across an inter-
national boundary,130 so that its effective functioning might make 
operations on the territory of more than one country desirable. 
If the Force is deployed in more than one country it would ob-
viously be desirable that its status be defined in a single agree-
ment, or, if this proves impossible, that the substantive provisions 
be identical. Nevertheless, depending on the type of receiving 
countries and the circumstances there may well be a basis for some 
128 UNEF Agreement, 1[39, p. 56. KEl.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 486 {1950). 
129 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1[15 (1957). 
130 Text at notes 11 to 14 supra. 
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variations in these provisions. The present arrangements with 
Egypt furnish a valuable precedent and a model on which alterna-
tive agreements can be prepared in advance of future needs. This 
kind of advance preparation, which would have to be flexible 
enough to take into account the need for variation, could facilitate 
the rapid deployment of a future UN force by removing doubts 
as to its role and status on the part of both the contributing and 
receiving states. 
III. Other Problems Posed by the Force 
A. Death and Injury Claims. The United Nations' liability for 
claims resulting from death or injury to members of the Force 
remains an open question. The Secretary General stated in his 
report of October 1957 that thirteen members of the Force have 
died or been killed,131 in addition to several injury cases; but no 
claims had as yet been filed against the United Nations. Mr. 
Hammarskjold's position is that such death or injury qualifies the 
personnel or their dependents for benefits under their respective 
national service schemes, which should administer these payments 
and later file claims with the United Nations. He has requested 
that such claims be limited to "cases of death or serious disability 
involving a material cost to the Government." In view of the 
uniqueness of the problem, the Secretary General has requested 
a temporary period during which claims can be dealt with on the 
merits of each case, so that formal rules need not be established 
at this time.132 Ideally, all of these losses should be borne by the 
United Nations rather than the contributing states, as it is in the 
service of that organization that they are incurred. Claims which 
arise specifically from service in UNEF and do not meet the stand-
ard proposed by the Secretary General constitute an inequitable 
burden on the contributing state. 
B. Financial Problems. The most troublesome problem asso-
ciated with UNEF is how it should be properly financed.183 The 
Soviet Union has insisted that the parties who brought on the 
131 U.N. Doc. A/3694, 1196 (1957). Causes of the fatalities are said to be mainly acci-
dental shootings, encounters with mines and traffic accidents, id., 1122. 
132 Id., 11\192 to 98. 
133 Costs for the 14-month period ending December 31, 1957 were estimated at between 
$24 million and $30.5 million. U.N. Doc. A/3694, \[99 (1957). This does not take account 
of the considerable savings accruing to the UN due to facilities contributed by various 
member states, id., \[\[58 to 62. 
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crisis should bear the entire cost.134 In addition to the obvious 
political objections to this kind of solution in the Suez controversy, 
it would seriously impair the possibility of employing a UN force 
by requiring a political judgment of the responsibility for the 
crisis in each case.135 Setting aside the practical problems associated 
with obtaining funds from the members of the UN,136 the policy 
question presented is how much of the cost should be borne by 
the United Nations as a whole, and how much by the states con-
tributing units. It might seem that the UN should bear the entire 
burden, but it should be recalled that these forces constitute part 
of the respective national military establishments which may be 
withdrawn by these governments. If the UN were to pay all costs 
it would be in part reimbursing these states for pay and similar 
expenses which they would have incurred in any event. The first 
formula recommended and used by the Secretary General there-
fore called for the contributing states to pay all costs of equipment 
and salaries, and for the United Nations to assume all other ex-
penses.137 This formula did not, however, take account of the extra 
costs incurred by the contributing states in maintaining their units 
overseas, and the General Assembly therefore approved138 the 
Secretary General's proposal139 to reimburse these states "for all 
extra and extraordinary costs" incurred in making its forces avail-
able to UNEF beyond the first six months.140 These extra costs 
include any extra pay or allowances paid by reason of service with 
UNEF and for abnormal depreciation and destruction of equip-
ment.141 The Force is being financed outside the normal budget 
of the United Nations.142 An initial sum was provided by the 
134 Report of the Fifth Committee, U.N. GENERAL AssEMBLY OFF. R.Ec., 11th Sess. 
Annexes, Agenda Item 66, p. 65, lf25 (Doc. No. A/3560 Add. I) (1957). 
135 Moreover, such a policy would confront the parties to a dispute, whose coopera-
tion is of primary importance, with the prospect of an economic penalty as the result 
of agreeing to the use of a force. 
136 See Report of Mr. Carnahan from the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs, Relative 
to the Establishment of a United Nations Force, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
International Organizations and Movements of the Committee for Foreign Affairs on 
H. Res. 367 and H. Con. Res. 373, 85th Cong., 2d sess., p. 99 (1958). 
137 U.N. Doc. A/3694, lf80 (1957). 
138 Res. 1151 (XII) U.N. Doc. AjRes/1151 (XII) (Nov. 1957). 
139 U.N. Doc. A/3694, lf88 (1957). 
140 The reason for the six-month dividing line is that the additional costs incurred 
beyond that point exceed what a contributing state could foresee or be fairly expected 
to bear. Id., lf85. 
141 Id., lf91. 
142 Id., lf 48. 
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establishment of a special account in the amount of $10 million 
which was financed by special assessments according to the scale 
of assessments used in connection with the normal budget.143 
Costs in excess of that amount have been left to voluntary con-
tributions by members.144 In response to the Secretary General's 
October report, the General Assembly appropriated additional 
funds for operations in 1957-1958 and several additional voluntary 
contributions were received.145 Nevertheless, the reluctance of 
the membership as a whole to bear the costs of UNEF is one of 
the more sobering considerations associated with planning for 
a permanent force.146 
IV. Conclusion 
The fact that the General Assembly cannot impose a binding 
obligation on any state to accept a UN force makes its effective-
ness largely dependent on the consent of the receiving state. The 
present status agreement with Egypt accords the UNEF more rights 
than it could demand under customary international law and yet 
adequately protects the interests of Egypt. On the whole, these ar-
rangements have worked satisfactorily, except that the Force 
should be given greater discretion with regard to its deployment 
and authority to take action against individual violators of the 
truce which it is policing. 
It would appear that the establishment, as opposed to station-
ing and operation, of a UN force in a country does not require 
the advance consent of any particular member. UNEF has pro-
vided a precedent on which the framework and legal status of a 
permanent force can be constructed. The advance organization of 
a force could greatly enhance its usefulness both to the General 
Assembly which may recommend its employment, and to the 
143 Id., IT\T50, 51. 
144 Id., ITIT52, 53. Voluntary contributions were meager until several came in during 
November in response to the plea of the Secretary General, ibid., and U.N. Docs. A/3745, 
U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFF. REc., 12th Sess., Agenda No. 65 (1957), A/3694/ Add. 1 (Nov. 
1957). 
145 Ibid. 
146 Twenty percent of the contributions assessed to supply the first $10 million have 
not been paid because the members involved have refused. U.N. Doc. A/3694, \T66 (1957). 
Only a little more than half of this assessment had been paid when the Secretary General 
issued his report in October 1957 (id., \T99). Sanction against members who refuse to pay 
is found in article 19 of the Charter which provides that if a member is in arrears in 
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization in an amount equal to or 
exceeding the amount of contributions due from that member for the preceding two full 
years, that member shall have no vote in the General Assembly. 
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Security Council, which may call upon the parties to a dispute to 
admit the force as a "provisional measure" under Article 40,147 
or as a measure not involving the use of armed force under Article 
39148 of the United Nations Charter. 
Dudley H. Chapman, S.Ed. 
147 It is probable that the Security Council cannot impose a legal obligation by calling 
upon the parties to a dispute to comply with provisional measures under this article, but 
the failure to comply may justify use of sanctions under article 42. The obligation is 
considered stronger than any the General Assembly is capable of imposing. GooDRICH AND 
HAMBRO, CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 274, 275 (1949). 
148See note 14 supra. 
